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I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid growth and evolution of technology over the last several 
decades has met mixed reactions from the legal community. Generally, 
courts have been forced to adapt old doctrines or adopt new ones to 
encourage innovation in the fields of science and technology. Copyright 
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law has changed significantly, since its eighteenth-century inception, to 
account for technological advances while remaining true to its 
constitutional mandate: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts . . . .”1 To further promote this progress, American courts have 
carved out the “fair use” doctrine, which allows infringing uses that meet 
certain criteria.2 
The judicial expansion of the fair use doctrine, as part of a greater 
effort to liberalize copyright law, is necessary to protect the growth of 
innovation in a rapidly changing digital world. The federal copyright 
statute enumerates four factors that courts should consider before 
determining fair use.3 Courts have recently developed a limited market 
analysis for determining the fourth fair use factor, “the effect of the 
[unauthorized] use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”4 The controlling weight courts have given to the 
effect of unauthorized uses upon the value of derivative works has 
complicated this market analysis.5 
As the wealth of online information increases, the search cost 
associated with finding any particular piece of information rises. Thus, 
the continued development of increasingly comprehensive search 
                                                                                                             
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For an interesting analysis of the Copyright clause, 
see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 
(2006). Oliar argues that the “promote [] Progress” language is not merely a nonbinding 
preamble, but a requisite limitation on congressional power. Basing his analysis on 
records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Oliar provides three compelling 
reasons for his limitation argument. First, Madison and Pinckney’s initial proposals for 
the intellectual property clause granted plenary power to Congress; however, these 
plenary grants of power were not ultimately adopted. Id. at 1776-77.  Second, Madison 
and Pinckney, both nationalists, supported a strong central government while other 
members supported states’ rights. Id. at 1777. The fact that Madison and Pinckney were 
both nationalists suggests that the intellectual property clause was the result of a 
compromise between the nationalist drafters of the clause and the other members who 
wished to limit Congressional power with the “promote [] Progress” language. Id. Third, 
the “promote [] Progress” language was originally associated with proposals for 
Congressional power to encourage innovation and to establish universities. Id. While the 
Framers rejected these initial proposals, they retained the “promote [] Progress” language 
for the intellectual property clause. Id. 
 2 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 3 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 4 § 107(4). 
 5 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. 
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications 
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”); see 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see also Video Pipeline, Inc. 
v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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engines and other online categorizers has become all the more vital for 
Internet users. Recently, however, litigation over the availability of 
copyrighted information on those search engines has blocked the 
expansion of categorizers and indexers. To ensure the viability of these 
categorizers, a virtual necessity in a complex maze of information, 
copyright law must find a way to maximize categorizers’ efficacy while 
retaining the creative incentives that copyright law provides copyright 
owners. 6 
Appellate courts have failed to provide consistent analyses with 
respect to the fourth fair use factor.7 To ensure the continued growth of 
technological innovation and equitable distribution of the fruits of 
progress, courts should adopt a comprehensive fourth factor analytical 
methodology. This comment provides such a methodology. My 
suggested multi-step analysis requires courts to engage in an equitable 
balancing of benefits and harms. I also suggest several universal 
principles applicable to search engines and searchable databases to 
identify the many benefits these navigational tools impart to copyright 
owners. 
The sections of this comment provide the background necessary to 
understand the multi-step analysis. Part II discusses the Copyright Act of 
1976 and the fair use exception, as well as several influential cases 
affecting fourth factor analysis. Chief among these cases is Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.8 Although Justice Blackmun’s 
circular definition of market harm in Sony is not controlling, it has been 
highly influential. Part III discusses the conflict among the circuits 
regarding cataloguing and its effect on the potential market for, or value 
of, a copyrighted work.9 The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have upheld the 
validity of categorizers under fair use, while the Third Circuit has found 
that such categorizers do not merit fair use protection.10 Despite the 
                                                                                                             
 6 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the 
Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179 (2001); Frank Pasquale, Breaking 
the Vicious Circularity: Sony’s Contribution to the Fair Use Doctrine, 55 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 777 (2005). 
 7 17 U.S.C. § 107; David Nimmer, The Public Domain: “Fairest of Them All” and 
Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use Fairy Tales, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003); 
Pasquale, supra note 5; Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the U.S. Copyright Fair Use 
Cases, 1978-2005, http://www.bartonbeebe.com/documents/Beebe%20FU%20Precis.pdf. 
 8 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 9 I use “catalogue” or “categorizer” to refer to any system of information storage and 
retrieval that attempts to organize data for ease of use. See infra Part III.A. 
 10 Compare Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
use of thumbnail images on a search engine constitutes a fair use) and Ty, Inc. v. 
Publication Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that use of copyrighted 
images in a collector’s guide may qualify as a fair use) with Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena 
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agreement between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits, there still exists wide 
disparity in the appellate courts’ application of the fourth fair use 
factor.11 Part IV.A provides a comprehensive framework for analyzing 
the fourth factor implications in any fair use case. Although the analysis 
is rigorous, it is necessary to properly balance the equities involved. Part 
IV.B examines search engines and categorizers in general to highlight 
the unique benefits provided by these navigational tools. While search 
engines and categorizers should be analyzed under the comprehensive 
framework established in Part IV.A, these types of cataloguing systems 
present particular benefits to society. Such benefits should always factor 
into the inquiry and will often tilt the balance in favor of fair use. 
Therefore, this comment provides a consistent method of fourth factor 
analysis, which is necessary to preserve the benefits of Internet search 
engines. 
II. FOUNDATIONS OF FAIR USE AND FOURTH FACTOR PROMINENCE 
Fair use is an exception to copyright infringement.12 In other words, 
one who engages in fair use does not violate the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner.13 The statute provides four nonexhaustive factors that 
guide courts in determining whether to permit the exception: 
                                                                                                             
Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that use of clip previews 
of motion pictures in a searchable database was not a fair use). 
 11 See infra Part III.B. 
 12 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 13 The Copyright Act of 1976 grants several exclusive rights to the owners of 
copyrighted works. 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title 
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted 
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; 
and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.14 
While the statute provides no hierarchy of importance among the four 
factors, lower courts often adhere to Supreme Court dicta that the fourth 
factor is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”15 
Thus, it appears that the judiciary retains the power to mold the statutory 
factors and emphasize different factors in the spirit of equity. 
Although Congress codified fair use in § 107, it originated as a 
judicially-created doctrine.16 Recognizing these origins, Congress left the 
development of the doctrine to the judicial branch.17 Congress has 
emphasized that “there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the 
statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change . . . . 
[C]ourts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a 
case-by-case basis.”18 Because of the doctrine’s equitable nature and 
case-by-case adaptability, fair use has been criticized as “so flexible as to 
virtually defy definition.”19 To remedy this unpredictability, courts 
should adopt a consistent application of the fourth fair use factor, “the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.”20 However, courts and academia have struggled to come to a 
consensus regarding fourth factor application. 
For example, in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document 
Services, Inc.,21 the Sixth Circuit, in an en banc opinion, held that the 
                                                                                                             
 14 § 107. The statute also provides several examples of fair uses. “[T]he fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by 
any other means specified . . . , for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.”  Id. 
 15 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 16 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
 17 The 1976 amendment to the original Copyright Act was “intended to restate the 
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”  Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 20 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006). 
 21 99 F.3d 1381 (1996). 
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defendant’s sale of “coursepacks”22 to students was not a fair use. In 
coming to this conclusion, the fourth factor was decisive. Unlike its 
competitors, defendant Michigan Document Services (“MDS”) did not 
obtain permission from the copyright holders prior to printing and selling 
its coursepacks.23 Applying the fourth factor, the Sixth Circuit cited 
Supreme Court language that “to negate fair use . . . one need only show 
that if the challenged use should become widespread, it would adversely 
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.”24 The Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that if copyshops across the country printed coursepacks and 
refused to obtain permission fees from the copyright holders, such 
widespread use would adversely affect the licensing market of the 
publishers.25 
This analysis was a major source of contention between the 
majority and the dissents in Princeton University Press. The dissents 
focused on a key criticism of fourth factor application: reliance on a 
circular argument. Judge Ryan’s dissent summarizes the circularity as 
stated by the original panel opinion: “Evidence of lost permission fees 
does not bear on market effect. The right to permission fees is precisely 
what is at issue here. It is circular to argue that a use is unfair, and a fee 
therefore required, on the basis that the publisher is otherwise deprived 
of a fee.”26 The dissent found the majority’s analysis flawed because the 
majority first assumed that the copyright holders were entitled to license 
fees from MDS, and then the majority found that a loss of these fees 
rendered market harm to the copyright holders. By first finding that the 
copyright holders were entitled to a licensing fee, the majority presumed 
that which it was obligated to determine on the merits; the issue was 
whether the use was fair, and if the use was fair then no permission fees 
would have been required in the first place. 
Similarly, the circularity issue was of prime importance in 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.27 In Texaco, the Second 
Circuit held that photocopying of scientific and technical journal articles 
for use by Texaco researchers was not a fair use.28 In its fourth factor 
                                                                                                             
 22 Coursepacks are similar to anthologies in that they contain excerpts from more 
extensive works. However, the excerpts are not compiled by a publisher, but by a 
professor who tailors the excerpts based on the particular course he or she is teaching. 
 23 Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1384. 
 24 Id. at 1386-87 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25 Id. at 1387. 
 26 Id. at 1407 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (citing Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan 
Document Servs., No. 94-1778, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 7474, at *11 (6th Cir. Apr. 9, 
1996)). 
 27 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 28 Id. at 914. 
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examination, the court found that only a few journal subscriptions had 
been lost as a result of the copying, but large profits had been lost from 
the market for licensing fees for individual articles.29 Although the 
majority addressed the circularity problem, it attempted to circumvent 
the harm by explaining that courts may only consider “traditional, 
reasonable, or likely to be developed markets.”30 Therefore, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the market for licensing fees was “reasonable or 
likely to be developed” because such licenses could have been obtained 
through the Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”).31 
Despite the majority’s attempts to avoid the circularity criticism, 
Judge Jacobs’s dissent pointed out several flaws. First, the CCC was 
neither traditional nor reasonable and any possibility for development 
was subject to obstacles.32 Second, the circularity of the argument was 
not avoided: the market for licensing fees under the CCC cannot develop 
unless the courts reject fair use arguments like Texaco’s, and the courts 
cannot hold a particular use to be infringing unless there exists a market 
that will be harmed.33 Thus, the majority first assumed that the publishers 
were entitled to licensing fees through the CCC and the loss of those 
licensing fees resulted in harm to the copyright holders’ market. 
The conflicts regarding fourth factor circularity and licensing 
markets first came to the fore in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc.34 In Sony, the Supreme Court held that the use of the videotape 
recorder (“VTR”) for timeshifting35 purposes constituted a fair use. In its 
fourth factor analysis, the Court found that the VTR did not damage the 
market for television programs, but actually enhanced the programs’ 
value by allowing for broader public access.36 By allowing viewers to 
watch programs that they otherwise would have missed, the VTR 
enhanced both the value of the programs and the value of the 
advertisements shown during those programs.37 
                                                                                                             
 29 Id. at 930-31. 
 30 Id. at 930. 
 31 Id. The court noted that “[t]he CCC is a central clearing-house established in 1977 
primarily by publishers to license photocopying. The CCC offers a variety of licensing 
schemes . . . .” Id. at 929 n.16. 
 32 Id. at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 35 The Court explained “time-shifting” as “the practice of recording a program to 
view it once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it.”  Id. at 423. The Court went on to 
note that “[t]ime-shifting enables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss 
because they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or are viewing a program on 
another station at the time of a broadcast that they desire to watch.”  Id. 
 36 Id. at 454. 
 37 Id. 
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The Court conceded that some viewers might fast forward through 
the commercials of the recorded programs, but ultimately any lost 
advertising revenue due to fast-forwarding was more than offset by the 
totality of the benefits conferred on the copyrighted works due to time-
shifting.38 In essence, the Sony majority’s fourth factor analysis 
recognized that both the negative and positive effects of an unauthorized 
use should be considered.39 Yet the merits of this equitable balancing 
approach faded into the background as lower courts adopted the more 
restrictive view of market harm espoused by the Sony dissent. 
Despite the Sony majority’s analysis of both the positive and 
negative effects of the use upon the market, much deference has been 
given to Justice Blackmun’s dissent. Justice Blackmun argued that the 
fourth factor requires that “the infringer . . . demonstrate that he had not 
impaired the copyright holder’s ability to demand compensation from (or 
to deny access to) any group who would otherwise be willing to pay to 
see or hear the copyrighted work.”40 The dissent, rather than taking a 
comprehensive view of fourth factor analysis, narrowly defined the 
inquiry and relied on circular logic.41 Justice Blackmun first assumed that 
the use at issue was unfair and then determined that the unfair use 
harmed the market for licensing fees. This analysis has been detrimental 
to fair use determinations in subsequent cases like Princeton University 
Press and Texaco because it first assumes that which must be 
determined, whether the use is fair.42 Justice Blackmun’s approach is 
also problematic because it constrains the fourth factor analysis to the 
market for licensing fees. Any loss of licensing fees to the copyright 
                                                                                                             
 38 Id. at 453 n.36. 
 39 Pasquale, supra note 6, at 810. 
First, the case considered not only the negative, substitutive effects of the 
contested copying on the market for the copyrighted works, but also 
examined the positive, complementary effects . . . . Second, Sony either 
limited the range of “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed” 
markets that could be claimed by the copyright owner, or determined that 
negative effects on one market would likely be swamped by positive effects 
in other markets – thereby leading to a fourth factor finding in favor of the 
defendants. Either interpretation of the case expands the range of evidence 
that must be considered before a court can deny a fair use defense. 
Id. 
 40 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 485 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 41 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an 
Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997). 
 42 Although it may be true that the burden to prove fair use does shift to the potential 
infringer if the court finds the use to be a commercial use, Justice Blackmun’s dissent 
would have the court place the burden on the potential infringer even before the 
commercial use determination has been made. 
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holder creates at least some economic loss, and if this is the only market 
at issue, then the fourth factor will always cut in favor of the copyright 
holder.43 
The Sony majority’s broad approach to fourth factor analysis has 
been undercut in subsequent lower court decisions by the circular logic 
of Justice Blackmun’s dissent. The appeal of the circular argument flows 
from the substantial profits that copyright holders could obtain through 
licensing. Although the licensing revenues available to copyright holders 
can, in many instances, be a major source of profit, courts should first 
determine whether the copyright holder’s rights should extend into that 
particular licensing market. This would allow the courts to avoid the 
circularity evident in Princeton University Press and Texaco. 
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING CATEGORIZERS AND SEARCH 
ENGINES/SEARCHABLE DATABASES 
With the advent of the Internet and digital technology, the amount 
of information available to the public has grown exponentially. However, 
in order for society to make use of any type of information, there must be 
mechanisms in place to facilitate that use. The mere presence of 
uncategorized information breeds inefficiency and unnecessary search 
costs. A library of random books placed in random piles, no matter how 
extensive the collection, is of little use to society; in fact, the more 
extensive the collection, the more frustrating the search for any particular 
book. Thus, categorizing mechanisms are more necessary than ever 
before to organize information and to provide an efficient means of 
dissemination. 
Although this article focuses on Internet search engines, the 
fundamental disagreement among appellate courts can be framed as a 
disagreement regarding fourth factor application to categorizers in 
general. This disagreement has led to a circuit split over the fair use 
status of categorizers. While the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have found 
that categorizers are entitled to fair use protection, the Third Circuit has 
held that categorizers do not merit such protection from the monopoly 
rights of copyright holders. Pivotal to these decisions, as is the case in 
most fair use decisions, were the courts’ methods of fourth factor 
application. Disparities between the courts’ methodologies have led to 
the current split. 
                                                                                                             
 43 “[I]t is a given in every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential 
market if that potential is defined as the theoretical market for licensing the very use at 
bar.” 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05(A)(4) 
(2004). 
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A. Seventh and Ninth Circuit Categorizer Cases—Laying the Foundation 
for a Comprehensive Fourth Factor Analysis 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ty, Inc. v. Publications 
International Ltd., addressed the fair use merits of a more traditional 
categorization system and laid the groundwork for a concrete and 
comprehensive fourth factor analysis.44 Ty, Inc., the manufacturer of 
Beanie Babies, sued Publications International (PIL) for publishing a 
series of books using images of the stuffed dolls.45 The district court 
issued a permanent injunction prohibiting PIL from selling its books, and 
awarded PIL’s profits from the sale of the books to Ty.46 On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit limited its decision to whether PIL was entitled to a full 
trial based on the fair use doctrine.47 
Writing for the court, Judge Posner noted the benefits that public 
criticism and exposure can bring to copyrighted works.48 As an example, 
Judge Posner explained that book reviews provide useful guides for the 
reading public, and quotations from copyrighted works in these reviews 
have the potential to increase demand for the works.49 Clarifying the 
economic rationale of the fair use doctrine, the court differentiated 
between substitutive uses and complementary uses.50 The court explained 
that nails and pegs function as substitutes for one another. Thus, if the 
price of nails falls, consumers will be more apt to purchase nails over 
pegs. While the relationship between nails and pegs is one of substitutive 
uses, the relationship between hammers and nails is complementary. 
Thus, if the price of nails falls, consumers have a greater incentive to 
purchase hammers. Hammer manufacturers gain an economic advantage 
when there is a healthy supply of cheap nails. Likewise, publishers gain 
an economic advantage when their books are reviewed. Consumers are 
unlikely to substitute their purchases of the actual books by reading a 
book review. Rather, consumers are often enticed to purchase the book 
after reading the book review.51 Book reviews facilitate both public 
criticism and the profits of the publisher. 
The court found that PIL’s books were complementary to Ty’s 
products; rather than diminishing the market for Beanie Babies, the use 
of the images in PIL’s books helped to create and expand that market. 
                                                                                                             
 44 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 45 Id. at 515. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 516. 
 48 Id. at 517. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 517-18. 
 51 Judge Posner, however, qualifies his analysis by stating that “owners of copyright 
on the worst books” may be harmed by poor book reviews. Id. at 517. 
2007] Copyright Implications of Searchable Databases 537 
Although the use was complementary, a finding that would militate in 
favor of fair use, the images were concededly derivative works protected 
by the Copyright Act.52 Avoiding a remedial problem associated with 
many fair use cases, the court chose not to declare every instance of 
PIL’s use of the images as infringing. Rather, the court distinguished 
among the different books at issue.53 The court concluded that the book, 
For the Love of Beanie Babies, was directed toward a child audience and 
contained commentary that was secondary to the images.54  However, the 
court also concluded that the book, Beanie Babies Collector’s Guide, 
was geared toward adults and contained far more substantive information 
in addition to the images, information like the monetary value of the 
Beanie Baby, its release date, and its retirement date.55 Beanie Babies 
Collector’s Guide also accused Ty of frequent trademark 
infringements.56 
Judge Posner took note of Ty’s practices in issuing licenses for the 
use of Beanie Baby images to publishers. 
Ty doesn’t like criticism, and so the copyright licenses that it 
grants to those publishers whom it is willing to allow to publish 
Beanie Baby collectors’ guides reserve to it the right to veto any 
text in the publishers’ guides. It also forbids its licensees to 
reveal that they are licensees of Ty.57 
The court found that this licensing strategy was akin to a book publisher 
who utilizes licensing rights to prevent poor book reviews. Ty used its 
licensing rights to potentially deceive consumers: although Ty could veto 
any negative criticism of its products or practices by its licensees, Ty 
represented to consumers that it did not have a hand in the licensees’ 
publications.58 
In an attempt to convince the court that PIL copied more than 
necessary to produce its guide, Ty argued that the books reproduced 
images of the entire line of Beanie Babies, similar to a book reviewer 
who reproduces the whole book.59 Yet, Judge Posner emphasized that a 
                                                                                                             
 52 Id. at 518-19. 
 53 Id. at 519. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 520. 
 57 Id. 
 58 The court noted that Ty’s “standard licensing agreement requires the licensee to 
print on the title page and back cover of its publication the following misleading 
statement: ‘This publication is not sponsored or endorsed by, or otherwise affiliated with 
Ty Inc. All Copyrights and Trademarks of Ty Inc. are used by permission. All rights 
reserved.’” Id. 
 59 Id. at 521. 
538 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:527 
collector’s guide must be comprehensive in order to compete in the 
marketplace.60 Because Ty licensed collector’s guides containing the full 
line of Beanie Babies, a competitor would be pushed out of the market if 
it could not provide the same comprehensive treatment.61 Ty further 
argued that PIL could not publish any photos whatsoever, and would 
have to be satisfied with a verbal description of the Beanie Babies.62 The 
court found this argument unconvincing because such a requirement 
would devastate the guide’s chances in the marketplace.63 
Judge Posner articulated the fair use test in Ty as follows: “The 
question is whether it would be unreasonable to conclude, with reference 
to one or more of the enjoined publications, such as the Beanie Babies 
Collector’s Guide, that the use of the photos is a fair use because it is the 
only way to prepare a collectors’ guide.”64 Rather than mechanically 
applying the four statutory factors, the Ty court primarily relied on the 
purposes of the doctrine.65 However, the court did acknowledge that its 
distinction between complementary and substitutive uses was related to 
the fourth factor of the statutory test.66 Ultimately, the court held that the 
district court erred by failing to apportion the original damage award 
between the different texts based on the potential fair use implications of 
each individual book.67 The court also directed that if Ty could prove 
infringement on remand, it would not be entitled to all of PIL’s profits; 
Ty would only be entitled to profits attributable to the infringing 
images.68 
The Ty decision is important to a revised fourth factor analysis 
because it (1) attempted to comply with the original purpose of the 
doctrine, (2) distinguished between substitutive and complementary uses, 
and (3) apportioned damages based on the profits attributable to 
infringing uses. The Seventh Circuit’s recognition of complementary 
uses is akin to the Sony court’s consideration of the benefits that the VTR 
provided for copyright holders. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit also properly 
                                                                                                             
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 522. 
 65 In doing so, the court invoked the congressional intent that “‘courts continue the 
common law tradition of fair use adjudication . . . [which] permits and requires courts to 
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the 
very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’” Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)). 
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 67 Id. at 524. 
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2007] Copyright Implications of Searchable Databases 539 
balanced both the harms and benefits of a potentially infringing use in 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft.69 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kelly v. Arriba Soft addressed the 
fair use implications of images located on an Internet search engine.70 
Search engines have become the standard tool for users to navigate 
through the expanse of online information. Like the more traditional 
categorizing device of the collectors’ guide from Ty, search engines 
utilize copyrighted information to direct users to the original works. 
Thus, they inherently complement the copyrighted work, fostering and 
expanding the market for those works. Also similar to collectors’ guides, 
search engines rely on comprehensiveness to attract users. A search 
engine’s worth is measured primarily by its ease of use, speed, and its 
ability to direct users to the sought after information while excluding 
unwanted results. These measures of worth increase with increased 
comprehensiveness, assuming that the speed of the search engine is not 
adversely affected. 
In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of thumbnail images71 
of larger copyrighted images to display search engine results was 
protected as a fair use. Arriba Soft operated an Internet search engine and 
chose not to display the search engine’s results as text, but as thumbnail 
images.72 Kelly, a professional photographer, sued Arriba Soft for 
displaying his copyrighted works as thumbnail images on the search 
engine’s results page.73 To create its results page, Arriba Soft developed 
a “crawler” program that searched the web for images. The images were 
then indexed onto Arriba Soft’s server and used to create the smaller, 
lower resolution thumbnail images. The full-sized images originally 
retrieved by the crawler program were deleted from Arriba Soft’s 
server.74 
In applying the fair use doctrine, the Ninth Circuit noted that fair 
use “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute 
when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is 
designed to foster.”75 Further, the court noted that the statutory factors 
were not meant to be an exhaustive or definitive test, but were to be 
                                                                                                             
 69 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 70 Id. 
 71 A thumbnail image is a lower resolution, miniature version of a larger image. Id. at 
815. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 817 (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 
1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
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applied with the purpose of the copyright statute in mind.76 As a result, 
the Ninth Circuit’s determination provided a balancing approach in 
which the benefits of the search engine outweighed any potential 
negative implications to the copyright holder.77 
Writing for the majority, Judge Nelson applied the four-factor 
statutory test. On the first factor, “the purpose and character of the use,”78 
the court found that the use was transformative. Rather than being 
created for the purposes of artistic expression, the thumbnail images 
served the purpose of “improving access to information on the internet    
. . . .”79 Regarding the second factor, “the nature of the copyrighted 
work,”80 the court found that the creative nature of the copyrighted work 
weighed slightly in favor of Kelly.81 And as to the third factor, “the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole,”82 the court noted that “[i]f the secondary 
user only copies as much as is necessary for his or her intended use, then 
this factor will not weigh against him or her.”83 
Addressing the fourth factor, “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,”84 the Ninth 
Circuit emphasized the complexities associated with the analysis, 
explaining that courts are obligated to analyze “not only the extent of 
market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but 
also ‘whether unrestricted and wide-spread conduct of the sort engaged 
in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on 
the potential market for the original.’”85 The court determined that 
Kelly’s images were related to several markets.86 One of the markets was 
the market of Internet users who would be attracted by Kelly’s 
photographs to his website. The website also sold advertising space, 
books, and travel packages.87 Another market was the licensing market, 
in which Kelly could license his images to other sites or to a photo 
database.88 
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 77 Id. at 822. 
 78 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 79 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819. 
 80 § 107. 
 81 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820. 
 82 § 107. 
 83 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821. 
 84 § 107. 
 85 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 590 (1994)). 
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Of particular relevance to the fourth factor analysis was the fact that 
users would have to access Kelly’s webpage for the full-sized image.89 
Rather than prematurely finding that Arriba Soft’s use was detrimental to 
Kelly’s licensing market, the court made the opposite finding - instead of 
harming the market, the use of the images on Arriba Soft’s search engine 
directed users to Kelly’s site.90 The thumbnails could not serve as a 
substitute due to their lower resolution.91 No matter how widespread the 
use of the thumbnail images, any such widespread use would not replace 
the necessity of visiting Kelly’s website for the larger, clearer images.92 
Although the court made clear that the poor quality of the thumbnails 
was not necessarily a factor weighing in favor of fair use, in this 
instance, the quality of the images was central to their value as 
photographic images.93 An additional factor that influenced the fair use 
determination was the fact that Arriba Soft did not sell or license the 
thumbnails.94 The court held that the use of Kelly’s images as thumbnails 
was not harmful to the market for, or value of, the images, and thus, this 
factor worked in favor of a finding of fair use.95 
Ultimately, the court found that factors one and four worked in 
favor of Arriba Soft, factor three was neutral, and factor two weighed 
slightly in favor of Kelly.96 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
thumbnails constituted a fair use.97 Despite the influence of Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent in Sony, the Ninth Circuit did not require that “the 
infringer . . . demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright holder’s 
ability to demand compensation from (or to deny access to) any group 
who would otherwise be willing to pay to see or hear the copyrighted 
work.”98 Kelly proved to be a high-water mark for search engine validity 
in which the court properly balanced the harms and benefits of the 
unauthorized use on the market for the original work. 
                                                                                                             
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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 95 Id. at 822. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
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B. The Third Circuit’s Finding Against Fair Use in Video Pipeline 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista 
Home Entertainment, Inc.,99 dealt a blow to the fair use status of 
copyrighted material on search engines. The court’s decision illustrates 
the flaws of fourth factor analysis as to “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”100 Although the 
fourth factor analyses used by the Seventh Circuit in Ty and the Ninth 
Circuit in Kelly were not structured enough to provide a legitimate 
standard for uniform future application, the courts had at least taken steps 
in the right direction. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits both recognized 
the importance of distinguishing between substitutive and 
complementary uses, and the inherent benefits that accrue to the 
copyright holder when the use is deemed complementary. Further, the Ty 
Court separated the potentially infringing uses by instrumentality, For 
the Love of Beanie Babies and Beanie Babies Collectors’ Guide, and 
limited the remedy of the copyright holder to the profits directly derived 
from the infringing use as opposed to all profits that PIL had derived 
from both books.101 Despite these key additions to the fourth factor 
analysis, the Third Circuit failed to separate the fair use analyses of the 
instrumentalities at issue in Video Pipeline and also fell victim to the 
circular reasoning of the Sony dissent.102 
In Video Pipeline, the Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s 
preliminary injunction against Video Pipeline for the company’s 
unauthorized display of Disney “clip previews” on its websites.103 From 
the outset, Video Pipeline stood little chance of success due to the court’s 
question-begging definition of “clip previews” as two-minute segments 
from a video, displayed without authorization from the creator, and “used 
in the same way as an authorized movie ‘trailer.’”104 This court-imposed 
definition presupposed that the clip previews were “used in the same 
way” as the derivative-work trailers.105 Thus, the court began by 
assuming that the clip previews were not transformative, a first factor 
determination which has a significant bearing on the outcome of the 
fourth factor as well.106 
                                                                                                             
 99 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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Video Pipeline was originally granted a license to use Disney 
trailers on promotional videos created by Video Pipeline for sale to retail 
stores.107 However, in 1997, Video Pipeline began to use the Disney 
trailers, along with its other licensed trailers, on its Internet sites.108 
Video Pipeline then entered into agreements with retail websites to 
provide the retailers with access to the Video Pipeline trailers.109 To 
ensure that the retailers’ customers could not save the trailers on their 
computers after viewing, the trailers were streamed, i.e. the videos could 
neither be downloaded to nor stored on the customers’ computers.110 
Among the retail websites that paid Video Pipeline for this service were 
well-known media companies like Yahoo!, Amazon, and Best Buy.111 
Despite the commercial nature of VideoPipeline.net, Video Pipeline 
also operated VideoDetective.com, which consisted of a publicly 
searchable database of previews.112 The database allowed visitors to 
search for a movie by title, actor, scene, or genre and then provided 
access to the trailers from VideoPipeline.net.113 In addition, when 
searching for a particular video, the site provided a link to online retailers 
that sold the video.114 
Disney requested that Video Pipeline remove its trailers from both 
VideoPipeline.net and VideoDetective.com, and the company promptly 
acquiesced.115 However, Video Pipeline then replaced the deleted trailers 
with its own two-minute previews, which contained scenes from the 
original movies rather than from the trailers.116 The Third Circuit noted 
that these “clip previews” were significantly different from the trailers.117 
Disney emphasized that it also displayed its own trailers on the Internet 
and used the presence of trailers on its websites to cross-promote other 
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 117 The Third Circuit found that 
[e]ach clip preview opens with a display of the Miramax or Disney 
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Id. at 195-96. 
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products.118 For example, Disney had an agreement with Apple to 
provide links to the Apple website.119   
The Third Circuit began its fair use analysis by noting that it must 
“bear in mind [copyright law’s] purpose to encourage ‘creative activity’ 
for the public good.”120 Additionally, the court claimed that its analysis 
would “take into account where relevant Disney’s original full-length 
films and its trailers” because “the statute directs [the court’s] attention 
under factor four to the effect of the allegedly infringing uses on both the 
potential market for any derivative works . . . and the potential market for 
the originals.”121 Despite this initial declaration that the court would 
engage in a principled fourth factor analysis of both the original works 
and the derivative works, the court ultimately failed to follow its own 
advice. 
Writing for the court, Judge Ambro found that the first factor 
weighed against a finding of fair use.122 It was clear that Video Pipeline’s 
use of the clip previews was commercial in nature because the company 
charged retail websites to stream its previews.123 As part of a first factor 
inquiry, the court went on to examine whether the use was 
transformative.124 Although the clip previews did not serve the same 
purpose as the full length films, the clip previews did essentially serve 
the same purpose as the derivative trailers.125 Invoking the rationale of 
Judge Posner in Ty, the court emphasized that the clip previews were 
substitutes rather than complements of the Disney trailers.126 
Of relevance to the categorizer debate, the court attempted to 
distinguish the Video Pipeline database from that in Kelly.127 Although 
the Third Circuit noted that the thumbnail images used in Arriba Soft’s 
search engine constituted a fair use, the court found that Video Pipeline’s 
database did not serve the same purpose as Arriba Soft’s search 
engine.128 The court stated: 
As used with retailers’ web sites, VideoPipeline.net does not 
improve access to authorized previews located on other web 
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sites. Rather, it indexes and displays unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted works. VideoDetective.com does permit viewers to 
link to legitimate retailers’ web sites, but a link to a legitimate 
seller of authorized copies does not here, if it ever would, make 
prima facie infringement a fair use.129 
The court’s failure to see the similarities between the two categorizers is 
apparent from the initial description of the Video Pipeline database as 
displaying “unauthorized copies of copyrighted works.”130 The court also 
misinterprets the holding in Kelly.131 Rather than improving access to 
“authorized” works on other websites, the Arriba Soft search engine’s 
greatest asset, as in any search engine, was “improving access to 
information on the internet.”132 Judge Nelson’s fair use finding in Kelly 
was not predicated on the fact that the search engine only provided 
results that were “authorized.”133 The improvement of access was the 
essential finding that led to a finding in favor of Arriba Soft.134 Perhaps 
the Third Circuit in Video Pipeline was not referring to the websites to 
which the users of the Arriba Soft search engine were directed, but rather 
to the results page which included the thumbnail images. If that was the 
case, the Third Circuit’s analysis fails as well, because the results (the 
thumbnail images) were “authorized” precisely because they were found 
to be a “fair use.”135 
In concluding that the first factor weighed against Video Pipeline’s 
fair use defense, the court failed to analyze the nature of Video Pipeline’s 
database.136 Rather than simply displaying individual clips, the web site 
categorized all of its previews in terms of title, actor, scene, and genre.137 
The structure within which the clip previews was situated, as a 
categorizing mechanism, should have been evaluated by the Third 
Circuit in its analysis of the first factor. Absent any further analysis into 
the nature of the search engine’s structure, the first factor determination 
against fair use crippled any hopes of a favorable fourth factor finding–
the use was determined to be commercial and the use was found not to be 
transformative. 
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As to the second fair use factor, the court determined that the 
original motion pictures and derivative trailers were creative works.138 As 
a result, these creative works were closer to the core of copyright 
protection. Although Disney had not released all of its movies to the 
public, the court concluded that the second factor weighed against a 
finding of fair use.139 
The court found that the third factor weighed in Video Pipeline’s 
favor.140 Assessing the “amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” the court noted that the clip 
previews consisted of only two minutes from the full length films.141 
Additionally, the previews did not reveal the heart of the movies.142 
Therefore, the amount copied was small enough to warrant a finding in 
favor of Video Pipeline.143 It is important to note that this factor was 
weighed as against the original and not the derivative work.144 
Although the district court found that the fourth factor weighed 
neither for nor against either party, the Third Circuit concluded that this 
factor weighed against Video Pipeline.145 Citing Campbell, the court 
emphasized that this factor “must take [into] account not only . . . harm 
to the original but also . . . harm to the market for derivative works.”146  
The court clearly understood its obligation to consider both the original 
full-length films and the derivative trailers.147 In addition, the Third 
Circuit noted that “the statute directs [the court’s] attention under factor 
four to the effect of the allegedly infringing uses on both the potential 
market for any derivative works . . . and the potential market for the 
originals.”148 Despite this statutory mandate, the court ignored any 
analysis of the effects on the original work.149 Dismissing, rather 
offhandedly, the statutory mandate to balance the effect of Video 
Pipeline’s use upon both the original work and the derivative works, the 
court simply noted that 
[b]ecause the issues pertaining to the potential harm to the market 
for Disney’s derivative trailers are more straightforward, we 
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focus our analysis on this area and do not review the District 
Court’s conclusion as to harm to the market for the original full-
length films. It is in this context that we conclude that the fourth 
factor weighs in Disney’s favor.150 
As to the fourth factor, Video Pipeline made the initial argument 
that no one would pay for trailers alone.151 This argument was easily 
countered with evidence that retail websites had, in fact, paid Video 
Pipeline for access to its previews database. The court emphasized that 
Video Pipeline’s interpretation of fourth factor harm was too narrow. 
Instead of considering only the effect on the market, the statute directed 
the court to also consider the effect of the use on the value of the work.152 
Despite this emphasis on the use’s effect on the value of the original 
work, the court again failed to follow its own account of the relevant 
legal standard.153 Rather than broadly analyzing Video Pipeline’s use on 
the value of Disney’s films, which would include analysis of the benefits 
accruing to Disney as a result of the unauthorized use, the court narrowly 
analyzed the use and focused only on the loss of licensing revenues that 
Disney might suffer as a result of the unauthorized clip previews.154 
Disney introduced evidence that its use of authentic trailers on its 
sites led to cross-promotional advertising with other retailers like Apple, 
and the lure of the trailers was used to attract visitors to its own site, 
which allowed Disney to sell its own products and obtain marketing 
information.155 Based on these findings, the court concluded that the 
infringing use would have a deleterious effect on the market for the 
authentic Disney trailers.156 
Reiterating the impact of its first factor analysis upon the fourth 
factor, the court summarized by stating that the clip previews lacked 
transformative quality and therefore, would act as substitutes for the 
derivative work trailers. The court found that such a result would create 
cognizable harm to the derivatives.157 The court noted that this 
substitutive effect would result in retail websites using the services of 
Video Pipeline rather than entering into direct licensing agreements with 
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Disney.158 The court also found that Internet users searching for Disney 
trailers may be drawn to websites utilizing Video Pipeline’s searchable 
database rather than to Disney’s sites.159 Thus, the Third Circuit held that 
“‘unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by [Video 
Pipeline] . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the 
potential market for the [derivative works].’”160 
The strengths and flaws of the fourth factor analyses in each of 
these cases, Ty, Kelly, and Video Pipeline indicate the need for a more 
comprehensive and sound fourth factor analysis. Because the court in 
Video Pipeline limited its fourth factor analysis to the effect of the use on 
the market for the derivative trailers, it failed to consider the beneficial 
aspects of the use as a result of its inclusion in a publicly available 
searchable database.161 Although the market for derivative trailers was 
most likely harmed by the use, the analysis should have been more 
comprehensive, considering the effects upon both the derivative trailers 
and the original films. This broader analysis would have been in keeping 
with the Supreme Court’s Sony analysis of both the positive and negative 
effects of the VTR. Additionally, the court’s fourth factor analysis did 
not separate the potentially infringing uses by instrumentality, a 
separation that would have required separate fair use analyses for 
VideoPipeline.net and VideoDetective.com. This type of separation was 
recognized by the Ty court as a means of providing the appropriate 
measure of damages.162 
The current climate of technological innovation and information 
overload makes categorizers an absolute necessity. In an Internet-age 
where information is most easily accessible online, the potential social 
benefits of this ever-growing system can only be maximally harnessed if 
the viability of search engines is not impeded by possible copyright 
implications. The future of the fourth factor analysis will have a 
significant impact on the development of search engines and on the risks 
that firms are willing to take to provide the most efficient and socially 
beneficial mechanisms of information navigation. 
                                                                                                             
 158 Id. at 203. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.05(A)(4) (1993)). 
 161 Id. at 202. 
 162 Ty, Inc. v. Publ’n Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 524 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 
2007] Copyright Implications of Searchable Databases 549 
IV. A MODEL FOURTH FACTOR ANALYSIS 
While both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have found that 
categorizers are entitled to fair use protection, the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Video Pipeline has created a circuit split as to the legitimacy 
of these categorizers. The inconsistencies inherent in the Seventh, Ninth, 
and Third Circuits’ applications of the fourth factor analysis have made 
future litigation unpredictable. Such unpredictability creates a potential 
chilling effect on the development of online catalogues and indexers, 
particularly in a climate of rapid technological innovation. A model 
application of the fourth factor analysis to these cases should avoid the 
circularity of the Sony dissent, which finds that every unauthorized use 
immediately harms the potential licensing market and renders the fourth 
factor an automatic plus for the copyright holder. Particularly, given the 
nature of online categorizers and the advertising markets made available 
through in-line linking,163 clear limits must be placed on copyright 
holders to ensure that the temporary monopoly given to them is not 
abused to the detriment of the copyright statute’s ultimate purpose, “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”164 A thorough and 
searching inquiry into the markets for the original work as well as for 
derivative works is necessary to appropriately balance the harms and 
benefits to the original copyright holder.165 Anything less than this will 
result in a skewed analysis based not on equitable rationales, but on 
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 In-line linking allows one to import a graphic from a source website and 
incorporate it in one’s own website, creating the appearance that the in-lined 
graphic is a seamless part of the second web page. The in-line link instructs 
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Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003) 
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to copyright ambiguities: 
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 165 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. 
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preconceived judicial preferences for private commercial gains over 
public access to information.166 
The analysis requires that courts first divide any potentially 
infringing uses by the instrumentalities that enable those potential 
infringements. Then, after distinguishing between the potentially 
infringing instrumentalities, the court must define the actual and potential 
markets for the original work. The court must further define the actual 
and potential market for derivative works. After determining both the 
actual and potential markets for the originals and derivatives, the court 
can finally determine how the unauthorized use in question has affected 
those markets. A summary of the multi-step approach is provided in 
Appendix A. 
A. Developing a Multi-Step Inquiry 
Several attempts have been made to revise the application of the 
fourth factor, yet these revisions have not been adopted by the courts.167 
These approaches either fail to consider the economic motivations of the 
copyright holder or require too rigid an analysis, thereby undermining 
the equitable nature of the inquiry. A multi-step approach would provide 
a balance between judicial discretion and a greater degree of 
predictability for copyright holders and fair use proponents. 
The very nature of the fourth factor analysis necessitates a 
comprehensive judicial inquiry. Courts must assess “the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”168 Prior 
to examining the markets for the original or derivative works, the court 
should first divide any potentially infringing uses by the instrumentalities 
that enable those potential infringements. This step was taken by the 
Seventh Circuit, resulting in differing damage calculations for the two 
books at issue in that case. Although the copyright owner’s complaint 
alleged that the potentially infringing publications involved in Ty were 
both infringing uses, Judge Posner determined that only For the Love of 
Beanie Babies infringed and that the use of Ty’s images in Beanie Babies 
Collectors’ Guide was a fair use. 
                                                                                                             
 166 Although a thorough and searching analysis of markets for the copyrighted work 
may be undesirable due to the burden it places on courts, such a burden is not undue 
because of the constitutional mandates at issue as well as relevant precedent. The 
comprehensive analyses employed by the Supreme Court in Sony and the Seventh Circuit 
in Ty are examples of such cases. 
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After distinguishing between the potentially infringing 
instrumentalities, the court must define the actual and potential markets 
for the original work, which involves a value judgment as to whether the 
original owner should be allowed to monopolize a potential market.169 In 
doing so, the court must determine a number of potential markets for the 
copyrighted work, which entails a speculative inquiry into markets the 
copyright holder is likely to pursue.170 In order to contain the analysis of 
potential markets, courts should first rely on the copyright holder’s 
business model to determine the actual targeted markets. The Sony case 
provides a prime example of this business model inquiry. The Sony 
majority relied largely upon the factual findings of the district court in 
regard to the markets at issue. The district court noted five markets that 
were targeted in Universal’s business model: (1) theater, (2) television, 
(3) network telecasts, (4) local telecasts, and (5) theater redistribution.171 
The Court then noted that the primary revenue for Universal in running 
its programs was through advertising revenues.172 As a result of VTR 
time-shifting, more viewers were exposed to commercials than if the 
VTR did not exist.173 The Court relied on empirical data demonstrating 
that VTR copying was predominantly used so that viewers who were 
unable to watch the shows could do so at a later time.174 Ultimately, the 
most practical method of determining the potential markets for an 
original work and derivative works should be based on the copyright 
holder’s interpretation. Yet, the primacy of the copyright holder in this 
regard should only be a rebuttable presumption. A claim by the copyright 
holder that its copyright extends to any particular market can be rebutted 
by evidence showing that it has no concrete basis for its assertion, i.e. no 
plans to infiltrate that particular market or no research examining the 
profitability of that market. 
                                                                                                             
 169 Matthew Africa has noted: 
 It is more difficult to determine whether a copyright holder should 
control the new market where the alleged infringer uses copyrighted 
expression in a market that the copyright holder might not enter. The court 
must determine prospectively whether the copyright holder should control 
the market and if so, whether requiring a license is appropriate. 
Matthew Africa, Comment, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New 
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1145, 1156 (2000). 
 170 As noted in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., “the market for potential 
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general 
develop or license others to develop.” 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). 
 171 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, at 466-67 (1979). 
 172 Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 453 n.36. 
 173 Id. at 454. 
 174 Id. at 424 n.4. 
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After defining the actual and potential markets at issue for the 
original work, the court must then define the actual and potential market 
for derivative works, which also involves a value judgment as to whether 
the original owner should be allowed to monopolize the market. The 
consequences of the potential derivative market analysis are particularly 
acute in the case of online categorizers. In theory, a court could conclude 
that any use of any frame of a movie on an online categorizer would cut 
into the potential licensing market for the derivative market for film 
frames. However, in this case, the correct question for the court is 
whether the original copyright holder is likely to pursue an online market 
for the placement of its film frames on searchable databases. More likely 
than not, most producers of films are not in the business of producing 
searchable online databases. 
After determining both the actual and potential markets for the 
originals and derivatives, the court must determine how the unauthorized 
use in question has affected those markets. This analysis will further 
require an analysis of not only the harms to the potential licensing 
markets, but also the benefits that the use creates to the copyright holder. 
Appendix B provides an example of how this analysis would apply to 
Video Pipeline. Concededly, the numerical values that approximate the 
net effect of each potentially infringing use on each market are arbitrary. 
However, courts are left with the discretion to apply numerical values as 
they see fit, guided primarily by the insight of valuation experts.175 
Separate analyses are needed for each potential market of the original 
work and for each potential market for derivative works. If there are two 
instrumentalities at issue, the court must apply the “effect on the market” 
analysis to each instrumentality. 
B. Assessing the Benefits of Search Engines and Searchable Databases 
At several points in the multi-step fourth factor analysis, courts are 
required to weigh both the harms created by the unauthorized use and the 
benefits that the use creates for the original works and derivative works. 
To ensure that the circular approach does not continue to undermine the 
equities involved in fair use cases, it is necessary for courts to consider 
both the harms to the licensing markets created by unauthorized uses, as 
well as the benefits conferred upon those works by the unauthorized use. 
Although several theories have been posited to explain fair use policy, 
                                                                                                             
 175 Numerous market analysis companies retain valuation experts whose testimony 
would serve as the basis for determining the effects of potentially infringing uses on the 
market for a copyrighted work. See, e.g., Forrester Research, Inc., 
http://www.forrester.com/rb/; see also JupiterResearch, http://www.jupiterresearch.com/ 
bin/item.pl/home. 
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they have either fallen into the circularity of the Sony dissent or fail to 
consider the capitalist incentives inherent in copyright law. 
Following the Sony decision, one of the most cited policy rationales 
behind the fourth fair use factor is the market failure theory. This theory 
posits that a party is barred from the fair use defense when “the 
transaction costs involved in negotiating individual . . . licenses would 
inevitably exceed the potential gains in trade available.”176 An alternative 
theory analogizes the doctrine of fair use to that of eminent domain. This 
eminent domain theory holds that supporting the purpose of the 
Copyright Clause, to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts,”177 is the superior motive of the fair use doctrine.178 Under this 
theory, rather than allowing the copyright holder a monopoly on the 
work, unlicensed uses are fair uses when they do not harm, or benefit, the 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.179 Such harmless uses 
would not entitle the copyright holder to “just compensation.”180 
However, where the use does result in harm to the market for or value of 
the copyrighted work, “just compensation” must be paid in the form of 
money damages.181 Therefore, “courts [should] account for a copyright 
holder’s lost licensing royalties in its analysis of market effect only if a 
primary or derivative market for licensing the original work exists, and 
only if the copyright holder is willing and able to exploit that market.”182 
Search engines and other online searchable databases confer 
substantial benefits upon the public, which should factor into a revised 
fourth factor analysis. These categorizers are the sole providers of 
metadata, or data about data, and are the primary navigational tools on 
the Internet. Users rely on the comprehensiveness of these categorizers to 
attain the information they seek. However, the ability of these search 
engines to sift through the mass of information available online 
inevitably collides with copyright law. As exemplified in Kelly, search 
engines have difficulty determining which results are subject to 
copyright limitations.183 Although there are mechanisms by which 
                                                                                                             
 176 Lunney, supra note 165, at 985. 
 177 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 178 See Gregory M. Duhl, Old Lyrics, Knock-Off Videos, and Copycat Comic Books: 
The Fourth Fair Use Factor in U.S. Copyright Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 665, 729-730 
(2004). 
 179 Id. at 730. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 The Ninth Circuit noted that when Kelly objected to the use of his images on 
Arriba Soft’s search engine “Arriba deleted the thumbnails of images that came from 
Kelly’s own web sites and placed those sites on a list of sites that it would not crawl in 
the future.”  Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003). However, 
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copyright owners can protect their sites from inclusion on search 
engines, it is more likely that the search engines will return unauthorized 
copyrighted results to users before the copyright holder has an 
opportunity to protect his work from the use. However, in the case of 
more deliberately constructed searchable databases like Video Pipeline, 
the inclusion of copyrighted material is most likely within the knowledge 
of the database creator.184 Nonetheless, in either case, public benefits 
accrue as a result of public access to information facilitated by these 
navigational devices. 
Despite the public benefits that accrue to Internet users as a result 
of the availability of information on search engines and searchable 
databases, some harm may be done to the original copyright holders. 
This harm is more prevalent in cases where an entire copyrighted 
original work is capable of being accessed through the search engine. 
Although Kelly only addressed the clearly transformative use of 
copyrighted photographs into distorted thumbnail images, the court in 
that case did not address the copyright implications of access to the full-
sized versions of the photographs.185 
However, in Video Pipeline, the court was only assessing the harms 
that Disney faced as a result of short two-minute clips of its movies 
displayed on VideoDetective.com; there was never the potential for a 
user to download the entire movie.186 As a result, in Video Pipeline, for 
users to access clip previews multiple times on VideoDetective.com, 
they would have to access the database and type in the correct search 
parameters.187 If users could simply download the clip previews once, 
they would not have to go through the formal search process again and 
would not be exposed multiple times to advertisements and links to retail 
                                                                                                             
“[s]everal months later, Arriba received Kelly’s complaint of copyright infringement, 
which identified other images of his that came from third-party web sites.”  Id. 
 184 Video Pipeline originally obtained a license to use Disney trailers, but that license 
was revoked when Video Pipeline began to display the trailers on its website. Video 
Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 185 The Kelly court stated that 
[t]he second action involves the display of Kelly’s larger images when the 
user clicks on the thumbnails. . . . [And] as to the second action, we 
conclude that the district court should not have reached the issue because 
neither party moved for summary judgment as to the full-size images and 
Arriba’s response to Kelly’s summary judgment motion did not concede the 
prima facie case for infringement as to those images. 
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 817. 
 186 In fact, there was not even the potential for users to download the clip previews 
onto their computers for later viewing. The Third Circuit recognized that the videos were 
“streamed” to users and could not be downloaded or saved onto their computers. See 
Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 195. 
 187 Id. at 195. 
2007] Copyright Implications of Searchable Databases 555 
providers of the videos being streamed. Thus, the inability to download 
the clip previews could potentially result in multiple exposures to 
advertising and marketing techniques, ultimately benefiting the owners 
of copyrighted works available through the database. 
Yet there is still the possibility that any work or derivative work 
that is available on a searchable database could be subject to a license 
agreement. However, even when there is the potential for such a 
licensing scheme, the courts must first determine whether the copyright 
owner’s protections should be allowed to enter into the market of 
searchable databases. Surely, licenses would be required if the entire 
work was available on the database. But when much shorter snippets of a 
written work or a two-minute clip preview of a film are used, there is 
room for equity to find against such an extension of the copyright 
monopoly. As owners of copyrighted works demand licensing fees for 
smaller segments of their original works, issues regarding the market for 
derivatives necessarily come into play. In the context of online 
categorizers and indexers, a finding that any small snippet of information 
or film available on a database is subject to a license agreement would 
cripple the ability of such databases to exist. Therefore, limits must be 
placed on what will constitute a derivative work worthy of the copyright 
owner’s monopoly power.188 
If the efforts of searchable databases to attain an ideal of complete 
comprehensiveness are quashed by copyright infringement suits, the 
owners of the original copyrights will be working against their own 
interests. As the Internet becomes ever more cluttered with information, 
the search costs necessary to sift through the massive amounts of data 
would impede any single user from finding the information he or she is 
seeking. Therefore, the use of small bits of copyrighted material on 
search engines is necessary so that users can recognize the location of the 
information they seek and access that information. This creates benefits 
for both users and copyright owners. 
The creation of new information and the placement of that 
information onto the Internet or into any library-like database has a 
detrimental effect upon the underlying system. Unless the information is 
organized in a way that makes it relatively easy for a potential user to 
                                                                                                             
 188 See William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: 
An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 382 (1999) (“The 
commodity approach to intellectual property confuses the fact that a commodity may 
have a market value with the existence of a legal entitlement to exercise monopoly 
control over that commodity.”); see also Joanna Pearlstein, 403 Ways to Slice a CD, 
WIRED, Mar. 2007, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/15.03/snackmusic.html#two 
(noting that “Warner Music found 23 ways to market one South Korean pop star’s 16-
track album—for a total of 403 SKUs (stock keeping units)). 
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find, the information is useless and simply clutters the landscape of 
knowledge. This only makes it more difficult to find the copyright 
owner’s information, as well as the information of every other participant 
in the system. Thus, the search costs associated with the glut of available 
information are a negative externality that results from copyright owners’ 
creations.189 
Due to the nature of any catalogue, online or print, the inclusion of 
any individual work has both positive and negative effects upon other 
works included in the catalogue. As additional works are included, the 
catalogue may gain popularity as a more exhaustive, and hence, a more 
reliable source of information. Thus, more users are drawn to the 
catalogue and the benefits to the copyright holder accrue accordingly. 
Although the addition of works within a catalogue may diminish the 
proportional share of total “space” allocated to any one work, the ensuing 
popularity growth of the catalogue will, in many cases, outweigh any 
proportional losses to the individual work.190 Inclusion of a work, or 
reference to a work, in an online searchable database likewise carries 
                                                                                                             
 189 Frank Pasquale analogizes this informational pollution to environmental pollution: 
 Environmental laws force polluters to pay for the ways they reduce the 
usefulness of air, water, and soil. Information law should adjust the rights of 
content creators in order to compensate for the ways they reduce the 
usefulness of the information environment as a whole. Every new work 
created contributes to the store of expression, but also helps make it more 
difficult to find whatever work a particular user needs or wants . . . . 
Copyright law should take negative externalities like search costs into 
account in its treatment of alleged copyright infringers whose work merely 
attempts to index, organize, categorize, review, or provide small samples of 
work generally. They are not simply “free riding” off the labor of copyright 
holders, but rather are creating the types of navigational tools and filters that 
help consumers make sense of the ocean of data copyright holders have 
created. 
Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privileging of 
Categorizers, 60 VAND. L. REV. 135, 140-41 (2007). 
 190 As a catalogue gains in comprehensiveness, it may eventually be considered a 
“definitive source.”  As such, inclusion in a “definitive source” catalogue would provide 
the copyright holder with marketability and reputational benefits. For example, as noted 
in Video Pipeline’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court: 
[Granger’s Index to Poetry] has been the “definitive source” in English for 
locating a poem. . . . It’s most recent version . . . provides detailed indexing 
of 55,000 works by poets such as Shakespeare and Shelley, as well as 
modern writers like Gary Snyder, Seamus Heaney, and Adrienne Rich. It 
covers all of Shakespeare’s sonnets, all of Ezra Pound’s cantos, the entire 
Beatles’ songbook, and the works of such poet/songwriters as Patti Smith 
and Bob Dylan. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (No. 03-763). 
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with it significant social capital, which relies in no small part upon the 
comprehensiveness of the database.191 
The case of online databases like that of Video Pipeline, which 
consisted of short two-minute clip previews, is particularly useful as a 
means of boosting the popularity of the original work. Because films are 
experience goods, or goods that consumers are not capable of placing 
value upon until they have been experienced,192 “[w]hen consumers can 
preview and browse works, they are far more likely to purchase them 
than when the goods are essentially a black box.”193 The court in Video 
Pipeline noted that “the clip previews do not constitute mere 
‘information’ about the movies, as would, for example, a list of the 
names of the actors starring in a film, or a statement of the rating it 
received. If Video Pipeline was only dealing in this type of information, 
the fair use doctrine might not be implicated at all; copyright protection 
does not include facts and ideas, but only their expression.”194 However, 
this analysis fails to consider that films are experience goods and that 
therefore, the experience of only two minutes of the full-length film is 
necessary to entice audiences to purchase the film. 
Another potential benefit accruing to Disney from the existence of 
the clip previews on the searchable database could have been the natural 
exposure of users to Disney videos even when those users were not 
particularly looking for Disney videos. Generally, the only users who 
will view Disney trailers on the Disney website are specifically looking 
at the Disney site and are targeting Disney merchandise. Yet, by placing 
the clip previews on a searchable database, Video Pipeline also allowed 
for those not primarily interested in Disney to view or be exposed to the 
Disney product. This was accomplished by allowing users to search 
according to various criteria including genre, actor, and title.195 For 
example, if a user was a fan of Tom Hanks and was interested in 
purchasing the film, “The Burbs,” the user would run a search for Tom 
Hanks on the Video Pipeline database. “The Burbs” would appear as one 
element in a list of Tom Hanks films, but so would Disney’s “Toy 
                                                                                                             
 191 Pierre Bourdieu defines social capital as “the sum of the resources, actual or 
virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network 
of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”  
PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WAQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 119 
(1992). 
 192 See Hal R. Varian, Markets for Information Goods, 
http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/japan/japan.pdf. 
 193 Pasquale, supra note 6, at 806. 
 194 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 199 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 2003). 
 195 Id. at 195. 
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Story.” Presumably, the user who has a particular penchant for Tom 
Hanks may also be drawn to purchase the Disney movie as well. Users 
searching for Tom Hanks films are unlikely to first search the Disney site 
for references to Tom Hanks. The case would be the same for a user who 
is interested in a particular holiday film but cannot remember the title to 
the film. Using Video Pipeline’s database, the user could search under 
“genre” for holiday movies. The user then might find a clip preview for 
“The Santa Clause,” and upon realizing that this was the very movie the 
user had been searching for, would purchase the film. Essentially, the 
ability to use various searching criteria allows users to obtain a variety of 
results that may lead to unexpected or unplanned purchases to the benefit 
of the copyright holder. 
Gregory Duhl has suggested an analysis that focuses on the public 
benefits that accrue as a result of the unauthorized use.196 His approach 
would replace the dichotomy between commercial and non-commercial 
uses with an analysis of the public versus the private benefits of the use. 
Invoking the constitutional basis of copyright to promote benefits to the 
public through creativity, Duhl argues that when an unauthorized use 
benefits the market for the original, only public uses should be deemed 
fair. Because almost any use can be construed to provide financial gain 
to the alleged infringer the commercial/non-commercial dichotomy is 
often unclear. Therefore, the public/private dichotomy is more useful to 
determine whether an unauthorized use supports the constitutional 
mandate.197 Because VideoDetective.net was an interactive catalogue 
open to public use, it should have been assessed for that benefit, in 
keeping with the constitutional mandate. In fact, as noted in 
VideoPipeline’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, their catalogue is used 
by public library systems in Seattle and Denver “to promote the public’s 
access to their video collections.”198 
On a broad scale, access to information promotes the public welfare 
and it is the purpose of copyright law to promote creative activity for the 
public good. As the Internet has allowed information to become more 
easily accessible and centrally located, search engines have become the 
keys to accessibility. Yet the availability of small portions of copyrighted 
information on search engines will continue to be problematic until a 
comprehensive fourth factor analysis is adopted by the courts. 
                                                                                                             
 196 Duhl, supra note 178, at 734-35. 
 197 Id. at 734-35. 
 198 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (No. 03-763). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
My proposed methodology provides a comprehensive approach to 
the statutorily mandated fourth factor analysis. While the approach 
recommended by this article does not purport to lead to a fair use finding 
for every use of every search engine, it does provide a framework to 
preserve the benefits that search engines provide. The multi-step 
examination is necessary to resolve the inconsistent analyses of the 
fourth factor. Although it may be true that the individual categorizers at 
issue in Ty, Arriba Soft, and Video Pipeline were distinguishable on the 
facts, the analyses instituted by the courts differed significantly. 
Particularly in the area of search engines and searchable databases, 
consistency of fourth factor application is essential to preserving the 
great benefits that these categorizers provide to Internet users. Thus, by 
focusing on both the harm to the markets of copyrighted works as well as 
the abundance of benefits, including public benefits, that accrue from the 
proliferation of search engine technology, this new approach comes 
closer to a realization of copyright’s original mandate. 
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APPENDIX A: MULTI-STEP FOURTH FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Step 1: Separate the potentially infringing instrumentalities 
 
Instrumentality A 
Instrumentality B 
 
Step 2: Determine the potential markets for both the original work and 
derivative works 
 
Potential markets for the original work: 
Market 1 
Market 2 
 
Potential markets for the derivative work: 
Market 1 
Market 2 
 
Step 3: Assess the net effect of the potentially infringing uses upon the 
potential markets 
 
Instrumentality A 
Potential markets for the original work: 
Market 1 ? Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 1 for the 
original work 
Market 2 ? Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 2 for the 
original work 
 
Potential markets for the derivative work: 
Market 1 ? Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 1 for the 
derivative work 
Market 2 ? Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 2 for the 
derivative work 
 
Instrumentality B 
Potential markets for the original work: 
Market 1 ? Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 1 for the 
original work 
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Market 2 ? Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 2 for the 
original work 
 
Potential markets for the derivative work: 
Market 1 ? Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 1 for the 
derivative work 
Market 2 ? Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 2 for the 
derivative work 
 
Step 4: Determine the final effect of each use upon the potential market 
for or value of the original work 
 
Instrumentality A 
Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 1 for the original work 
Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 2 for the original work 
Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 1 for the derivative work 
+ Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 2 for the derivative 
work 
= Final effect of instrumentality A upon the potential market for or 
value of the original work 
 
Instrumentality B 
Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 1 for the original work 
Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 2 for the original work 
Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 1 for the derivative work 
+ Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 2 for the derivative 
work 
= Final effect of instrumentality B upon the potential market for or 
value of the original work 
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APPENDIX B: MULTI-STEP FOURTH FACTOR ANALYSIS APPLIED TO 
VIDEO PIPELINE 
Step 1: Separate the potentially infringing instrumentalities 
 
Instrumentality A – VideoPipeline.net 
Instrumentality B – VideoDetective.com 
Step 2: Determine the potential markets for both the original work and 
derivative works 
 
Potential markets for the original work – Films: 
Movie theater market 
Television market 
Home video/DVD market 
 
Potential markets for the derivative work – Online Clip Previews: 
Retail in-store video compilations market 
Online licensing and cross-promotional advertising market 
Step 3: Assess the net effect of the potentially infringing use on the 
potential markets 
 
Instrumentality A – VideoPipeline.net 
Potential markets for the original work – Films: 
Movie theater market ? Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on Market 
1 for films = +1 
Television market ? Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on Market 2 
for films = +1 
Home video/DVD market ? Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on 
Market 3 for films = +1 
Potential markets for the derivative work – Online Clip Previews: 
Retail in-store video compilations market ? Net effect of 
VideoPipeline.net on Market 1 for clip previews = 0 
Online licensing and cross-promotional advertising market ? Net 
effect of VideoPipeline.net on Market 2 for clip previews = -2 
 
Instrumentality B – VideoDetective.com 
Potential markets for the original work – Films: 
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Movie theater market ? Net effect of VideoDetective.com on 
Market 1 for the original work = +1 
Television market ? Net effect of VideoDetective.com on Market 
2 for the original work = +1 
Home video/DVD market ? Net effect of VideoDetective.com on 
Market 2 for the original work = +2 
Potential markets for the derivative work – Online Clip Previews: 
Retail in-store video compilations market ? Net effect of 
VideoDetective.com on Market 1 for the derivative work = 0 
Online licensing and cross-promotional advertising market ? Net 
effect of VideoDetective.com on Market 2 for the derivative work = -2 
Step 4: Determine the final effect of each use on the potential market for 
or value of the original work 
 
Instrumentality A – VideoPipeline.net 
Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on movie theater market for the film 
= +1 
Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on television market for film = +1 
Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on home video/DVD market for 
film = +1 
Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on retail in-store video compilations 
market for the derivative work = 0 
+ Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on online licensing and cross-
promotional advertising market for the derivative work = - 2 
? Final effect of VideoPipeline.net on the potential market for 
or value of the original work = +1 
 
Instrumentality B – VideoDetective.com 
Net effect of VideoDetective.com on movie theater market for the 
film = +1 
Net effect of VideoDetective.com on television market for the film 
= +1 
Net effect of VideoDetective.com on home video/DVD market for 
film = +2 
Net effect of VideoDetective.com on retail in-store video 
compilations market for the derivative work = 0 
+ Net effect of VideoDetective.com on online licensing and cross-
promotional advertising market for the derivative work = - 2 
? Final effect of VideoDetective.com on the potential market 
for or value of the original work = +2 
